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ABSTRACT: Since the return of electoral democracy to Nigeria in 1999, two of the four 
elected presidents have been former military dictators who have stressed anti-
corruption and national security policies in populist campaigns.  As military dictators in 
previous years, they had instigated regimes that had practiced stern military discipline; 
as populists they have leaned toward these two policies.  Reactions to civilian corruption 
and threats to national security have represented the primary military rationales for mil-
itary intervention in the past.  A popular vote in 2015 for former military dictator Gen-
eral Muhammadu Buhari seems to have represented a continuing preference for popu-
lism over democracy. We will examine the new populism in Nigeria, complicated as it is 
by questions of ethnicity, religion and military identity, with a view to explaining the like-
ly outcome of the first peaceful transference of power from one political party to anoth-
er in Africa’s most populous country. 
Keywords: neo-liberal military-directed populism; democracy; democratization; corrup-
tion; national security. 
 
Democracia vs. Populismo: A Transformação da Política na Nigéria? 
 
RESUMO: Desde o retorno da democracia eleitoral à Nigéria em 1999, dois dos quatro 
presidentes eleitos foram ex-ditadores militares que enfatizaram as políticas 
anticorrupção e de segurança nacional em campanhas populistas. Como ditadores 
militares nos anos anteriores, instigaram regimes que haviam praticado severa disciplina 
militar; como populistas se inclinaram para estas duas políticas. As reações à corrupção 
civil e às ameaças à segurança nacional representaram as principais razões militares pa-
ra a intervenção militar no passado. Um voto popular em 2015 para o ex-ditador militar 
Muhammadu Buhari parece ter representado uma preferência contínua pelo populismo 
sobre a democracia. Examinaremos o novo populismo na Nigéria, complicado por 
questões de etnicidade, religião e identidade militar, a fim de explicar o provável 
resultado da primeira transferência pacífica de poder de um partido político para outro 
no país mais populoso de África. 
Palavras-chave: populismo; neo-liberal, democracia; democratização; corrupção; segurança 
nacional 
 
“The trouble with Nigeria is simply 
 and squarely a failure of leadership.” Chinua Achebe 1 
 
Does 1999 represent a break with the Nigerian political past, the advent of democ-
                                                          
1
  Achebe Chinua. The Trouble with Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1983. 
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racy in what had been a long-term military dictatorship?  In the following macro-
analysis, we will hypothesize that there has been a great deal of continuity between 
some of the presidential periods in the pre-1999 and the post-1999 eras, and that the 
country pioneered a distinctive African variant of neo-liberal military-directed popu-
lism in the pre-1999 period that survived largely, but not completely, intact after 
1999.  In the latter period it seems to have been directed, we hypothesize, by two of 
the more egregious pre-1999 neo-liberal military populists, following a neo-liberal 
populist agenda, and it is this factor more than any other that may explain why it is 
that Nigeria’s post 1999 ‘democracy’ has been so widely criticised as largely undemo-
cratic (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011: 323). 
This article, therefore, examines a conceptual issue in the study of politics which 
has, over the decades, attracted numerous scholarly writings especially since the 
‘third wave’ of democratization swept across much of Eastern Europe, Africa and 
some areas of Asia (Huntington, 1991).  It deals with what constitutes democracy, 
what distinguishes democracy from confusingly similar phenomena such as populism, 
and also how very different regimes might be classified and distinguished from one 
another based upon these similar criteria. Specifically, in the case of Nigeria, there 
have been numerous studies that have used various conceptual definitions, classifica-
tions and methodological tools to measure types of regime classifications in attempts 
to interpret the country since its return to civilian rule in 1999 (Diamond, 2002). None 
of these studies have in our view fully assessed the current civilianisation process in 
the context of the distinctly military-orientated populist rhetoric that has been used 
by two former military dictators who have subsequently become presidents and con-
solidated their political bases, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Muhammadu 
Buhari (2015- ). 
The purpose of this article, then, is to contribute to these existing studies of Nige-
ria by examining whether the last presidential election that brought into office by 
popular vote a retired military dictator, Muhammadu Buhari, was a victory for de-
mocracy, or what this article labels as neo-liberal military-directed populism in Nige-
ria. It should be emphasised, however, that neo-liberalism is, of course, fundamental-
ly at odds with most populist appeals, who are often more protectionist in economic 
policies, and yet neo-liberal populism has come to dominate Latin American and Eu-
ropean politics in the contemporary setting.  Central to neo-liberal populism in the 
contemporary setting is the reliance on the ‘people’ for legitimacy as supposed to 
democratically elected representatives. Earlier analyses of African politics had always 
characterised that continent’s populism as socialist, or social-democratic.  These 
analyses seem to have missed the distinction, so clearly put by Naomi Chazan and 
others, between ‘high politics’ and ‘deep politics’, however.  The socialist and demo-
cratic socialist populism of Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s, put simply, missed 
most Africans, few of whom were aware even of the existence of a national state 
house. Nigeria does have a long history in West Africa in brief periods of what can 
Democracy vs. Populism: the transformation of politics in Nigeria? 171 
PRACS: Revista Eletrônica de Humanidades do Curso de Ciências Sociais da UNIFAP 
https://periodicos.unifap.br/index.php/pracs   ISSN 1984-4352   Macapá, v. 10, n. 1, p. 169-189, jan./jun. 2017 
charitably be called quasi-democratization, followed by lengthy periods of military 
authoritarianism. In this sense, the Nigerians have perhaps come closer to Latin 
American political patterns than have their West African neighbours.  Nevertheless, 
this most populous of African nations has set political trends that have been influen-
tial, indeed pioneering, in the region/Africa.  These trends are all too often disregard-
ed by academic analysis at the time, however.  In 1968, when Ali Mazrui and G. F. 
Engholm (1968) discussed the new ‘intellectual populism’ of Africa, for example, their 
understanding of African populism completely missed the emerging neo-liberal mili-
tary Nigerian pattern in defining the new populism as the intellectual overcoming of 
ethnic divisions through the new socialism of leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Leo-
pold Senghor, a pattern that soon folded and, in any event, as noted above, barely 
reached most of the new citizens. When Henry Bienen discussed populist military 
regimes in West Africa in 1985, he spent more space on Tanzania, an East African 
country with little military influence, than he did on Nigeria (Bienen, 1985).2 It is true 
that populism is a very slippery term, one that often eludes objective definition. It 
sometimes appears to share affinities with ideological movements such as socialism, 
liberalism and nationalism but is however, different. As Margaret Canovan (2005) 
notes, 
 
… all these ‘isms’ range over widely varied phenomena, each gains a degree 
of coherence from a continuous history, willingness on the part of most ad-
herents to identify themselves by the name, distinctive principles and poli-
cies. Populism does not fit this pattern [as] there is no acknowledged com-
mon history, ideology, programme or social base, and the term is usually 
applied to movements from outside, often as a term of abuse (Canovan, 
2005, p. 79). 
 
Populism, therefore, often strives in societies where there is a weakening of tradi-
tional party structures, and/or deep penetration of mass media in its diverse forms. 
This provides an avenue for a potential political candidate to appeal directly to the 
electorate while bypassing the traditional political party structures and the ideologi-
cal commitments they embody. The campaign discourse mainly centred on being the 
‘outsider’ or ‘anti-establishment’ that promises to take back power from the ‘estab-
lishment’ and give it back to the people.  
Since entering into a formal democratisation process in 1999, there have been 
numerous populist rhetoric used by ‘civilian-led’ governments has they have at-
tempted with limited success to deal with internal security threats, but also seemed 
to have used them to build broad-based national support.  The first post-1999 ‘civil-
                                                          
2
 Nevertheless, he did devote three sentences to Nigeria, and managed to mention the Buhari coup, one of the 
early salvos in military populism in Nigeria: ‘The Nigerian coup on 31 December 1983 was led by senior offic-
ers.  But if the Buhari regime should be discredited, splits will widen in the armed forces and pressures from 
below will increase.  Still, Nigeria remains a country with a middle class that is relatively stable by African 
standards’ (375). 
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ian’ president, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), a Yoruba, had served 
between 1976 and 1979 as the military dictator cum President of Nigeria, and as dic-
tator established a democratic, or at least quasi-democratic, constitution, fought cor-
ruption (a central populist concern), and eventually handed power over to an elected 
civilian in 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, thus beginning the short-lived Second Republic.  
His populist rhetoric and foci, and particularly his firm opposition to the corruption of 
elites, were central to his post-1999 eight-year civilian and democratically elected 
presidency. The current elected president, Muhhamadu Buhari (2015- ), a retired Ma-
jor General who seized power in a coup d’état in 1983, had ended Shagari’s presiden-
cy and the Second Republic as a military dictator, and was himself deposed by his col-
leagues in 1985 after attempts to build a popular base by publicising his fight against 
elite corruption and opposition to part of the IMF loan conditionality, including cur-
rency devaluation. As a civilian and elected president he has likewise adopted a dis-
tinctly military-orientated populist rhetoric.   
The two ‘purely civilian’ presidents sandwiched between these former military dic-
tators, Alhaji Umaru Yar'Adua (2007-2010) and Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), were 
generally seen to be beholden to their populist military predecessor, and a founding 
member of their political party, (PDP) Olusegun Obasanjo. Yar'Adua, who died in of-
fice in 2010, had the support of Obasanjo, primarily due to his perceived corruption-
free record as a state governor, and because Yar’Adua was a younger brother to 
Obasanjo’s military number two (Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua) when the lat-
ter was head of state from 1976-1979. Similarly, the then vice-president Goodluck 
Jonathan also had the support of Obasanjo to succeed Umaru Yar’Adua following his 
death, even though this was greatly opposed by northern political and military elites. 
Although both the Yar’Adua and Jonathan presidencies greatly encouraged neo-
liberal and populist stands on a range of issues, they tended to be assessed as having 
been less supportive of the neo-liberal military-directed populism that has dominated 
the civilianisation process in Nigeria since 1999.  
The presidencies of Obasanjo and Buhari, and their separate struggles with what 
we have chosen to call the neo-liberal military-directed populist dilemma, adoption of 
an anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric while embracing the international 
and national financial establishment’s globalisation prescriptions has been far more 
typical of Latin American countries than it has of African countries, at least thus far.3   
The anti-establishment stance in Nigeria, coming as it does from former military dic-
tators and their close supporters, would seem to be ultimately at odds with the ten-
ets of neo-liberalism, however. 
 
                                                          
3
 Former President Carlos Andres Pérez of Venezuela, is a striking case, among many, of this Latin American 
tendency.  His neo-liberal populism resulted in attempts at his overthrow by the military (including one by 
later leftist president, Col. Hugo Chávez), and his later impeachment for corruption after national outrage fol-
lowing his adoption of IMF mandated wage and price stabilization policies. 
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ON NEO-LIBERAL POPULISM AND ITS AFRICAN VARIANTS 
 
Democratising systems are often seen to be very undemocratic during the adap-
tive democratising stage,4 and thus vulnerable to the debilitating influences of dema-
goguery and populism.5  That latter condition is notoriously difficult to define, how-
ever, although most observers agree that populism is used primarily as a pejorative 
term, one that describes a system of which we do not approve, albeit one that invari-
ably holds to the principles of the sovereignty of ‘the people’, and the natural enmity 
of ‘the elites’, however ambiguously these terms are defined (McGuigan, 1992).  
Canovan argues that recent populist movements stress a ‘natural’ opposition be-
tween ‘the people’ and their elected representatives.6  Ostensibly, then, elected rep-
resentatives rapidly become ‘insiders’, or ‘elites’, and cannot be trusted, whereas the 
populist president remains transparent and visible.  Albertazzi and McDonnell offer a 
slightly tongue-in-cheek definition that captures some of the spirit and discourse of 
populism as  
 
an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of 
elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or at-
tempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, 
identity and voice (Albertazzi; McDonnel, 2008, p. 3). 
 
While it is difficult to identify in any specific instance a clear, populist ‘ideology’ to 
which Albertazzi and McDonnel refer,7  Howarth clarifies that there are three defining 
features of populism: appeals to ‘the people’ as both a political identity and a funda-
mental recruitment tactic; the creation of a barrier between the underdogs and the 
establishment (read: ‘enemy’), or the power elite; and the creation of effects that de-
fine ‘the people’ (Howarth, 2005, p. 204). 
Central to populism is the ambiguous role of the leader, as a charismatic driver of 
the populist agenda.  The populist leader is an agent who embraces symbolic and cul-
tural ‘markers’, valued elements of popular culture,8 that are considered inferior by 
the dominant elites, and thereby brings dignity to his or her followers, common peo-
                                                          
4
 Samuel P. Huntington’s classic argument in his 1968 book, Political Order in Changing Societies, that ‘political 
decay’ was a necessary prerequisite of institution building and hence part of democratization, has been 
roundly disputed by a range of critics, although perhaps most eloquently by Schmitter, P. C. and Karl Lynn, T. 
1991. What Democracy Is…and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2, 75-88. 1991.  
5
 It is often remarked that populism can be democratic, or anti-democratic. 
6
 Canovan, Margaret The People. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005, p. 75. 
7
 In their defence, they do mention that populists in Western Europe ‘merge their populism with more “estab-
lished” ideologies, notably liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, federalism and socialism…’ (4). Most of the-
se, of course, would not be considered ‘ideologies’ per se, at least not in the sense that Karl Mannheim used 
that term. 
8
 These can be food items, or cultural practices, or popular art forms, or popular sports, or a range of other 
popular values. 
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ple who ostensibly are suffering financially and have felt belittled (Panizza, 2005, p. 
26). In so doing, the populist leader reminds the followers of those non-democratic 
elements that invariably are part of democracy,9 and often there by legitimises biases 
(e.g., racism and other exclusionary practices), the ‘dirty secrets’ that a truly egalitar-
ian democracy cannot tolerate, but that a populist regime can celebrate, and thereby 
feel better about itself (Panizza, 2005, p. 27).  The populist leader must evince per-
sonal qualities that are both ordinary and typical of ‘ordinary people’…and also, at 
the same time, be demonstrative of a special drive and success (Panizza, 2005, p. 21)  
This, it is thought, is accompanied by a kind of charisma, although as Panizza observes 
based upon a number of historic populist leaders, that charisma is not necessarily 
embodied in the populist leader himself. The physical absence of a populist leader 
may even build his/her ‘charisma’ more effectively: 
 
The leader’s populist enigma is never more evident than when he is physi-
cally absent because of exile or other reasons, as has been the case of many 
populist leaders, including Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, Haya de la Torre in Pe-
ru, and Perón in Argentina.  In the leader’s absence, his/her return becomes 
a floating signifier as every utterance, letter or statement becomes open to 
conflicting interpretations by his followers, while the authority of the ab-
sent enunciator cannot be used to fix its ‘true meaning’ (Panizza, 2005, p. 
19-20). 
 
Populism, then, as an apolitical appeal to a set of ‘ordinary’ values, neither neces-
sarily left nor right of centre, ideological only in a very vague sense10 in which, as 
Albertazzi and McDonnell note, there are four precepts: ‘The people are one and in-
herently “good”….The people are sovereign….The people’s culture and way of life are 
of paramount value….[and] The leader and party/movement are one with the people’ 
(Albertazzi; McDonnel, 2008, p. 6).  
In this sense, then, it can be said that there is ‘an intimate connection between 
democracy and populism’, and, at the same time, ‘also an inherent tension between 
them’.11 Of particular relevance is the populist tendency to mistrust elections as inca-
pable of revealing the real will of the people.12 This is often coupled with the funda-
mental belief of populist leaders that the establishment and ruling elite are corrupt 
                                                          
9
 Panizza notes that most democracies remain a mixture of egalitarian democratic impulses and non-
democratic feelings in which ‘principles of technocratic rationality and guardianship constrain and override 
the principle of the sovereignty of the people’ (31). 
10
 Albertazzi and McDonnell note that populists ‘merge their populism with more “established” ideologies, 
notably liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, federalism and socialism’ (4), although they add that ‘unlike 
Fascism, for example, populist propaganda insists on the values of equality (among the people) rather than 
hierarchy and it is the community rather than the state which is said to be paramount’ (3). 
11
 Or even, as Pasquino argues, a fundamental incompatibility between them. See Pasquino,  Gianfranco. Popu-
lism and Democracy. In: Albertazzi Danielle and McDonnell Duncan ed. Twenty-first century populism; the 
spectre of Western European democracy. Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
12
 Ibid. 
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and manipulative.  As an interesting connection with Africa/Nigeria, most military 
coups have also tend to use corruption and political manipulation by corrupt elites as 
primary rationales to explain the central question that populism tends to address in 
all of its iterations, according to Betz and Johnson (2004): ‘what went wrong; who is 
to blame; and what is to be done to reverse the situation’?13 
In recent years, populism has gravitated in many systems to the right of the politi-
cal spectrum.  Focusing on the ‘dirty secrets’ that many citizens would rather have 
restored to some sense of acceptability, if not dignity, such as racism and xenopho-
bia, populism has taken on a decidedly anti-democratic14 and facilely demagogic ten-
or. In Europe, this has meant that most populist movements are stridently neo-liberal 
and have become focused upon policies that are xenophobic, anti-immigrant, anti-
Muslim and generally anti-Semitic.   
African populism, after the initial elitist, intellectual and socialist phase discussed 
by Mazrui and Engholm in the 1960s, expressed itself as opposition to conventional 
political parties, or least to multiple political parties in a system with party competi-
tion.  This is largely because of two factors: the initial control of political parties by 
civilian elites after independence; and the rapid movement of political parties after 
their founding to close identification with specific, often dominant ethnic groups. Sin-
gle national political movements, such as the Tanganyika African National Union15 in 
Tanzania, on the other hand, were acceptable, even demanded.  They would ostensi-
bly take over the system as the single legal ‘party’, and would thereby dispense with 
elite manipulation of political processes, as per Schumpeter’s characterisation of 
bourgeois democracy. More recent research of African populism expressing itself in 
opposition to conventional political parties have further discussed why urban poor 
vote for opposition parties and the populist strategies used by these political parties 
to incorporate the urban poor into the mainstream political arena (Resnick, 2014). 
Other studies have focused on the diverse forms of populism in sub-Saharan Africa by 
mainly focusing on identity-based, poverty-induced and protest populism 
(Banywesize, 2013). Emmanuel Banywesize (2013) argues that the first two types ul-
timately manifests in xenophobia and human rights violations and the justification of 
dictatorships in numerous sub-Saharan countries. 
Central to African populism as ascribed to by military regimes has been an abso-
lute rejection of high-level (elite) corruption while adopting international neo-liberal 
prescriptions. This has involved what we will refer to as the ‘neo-liberal military-
                                                          
13
 As quoted in Albertazzi Danielle and McDonnel Duncan. Ibid.Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre.’ In: 
Albertazzi Danielle and McDonnell Duncan ed. See also Betz Hans-Georg; Johnson Carol. Against the 
Current—Stemming the Tide: The Nostalgic Ideology of the Contemporary Radical Populist Right. Journal of 
Political Ideologies 9, p. 311-327, 2004. 
14
 Particularly if we insist in the definition of democracy on a menu of basic human rights as constituting a criti-
cal part of democracy. 
15
 Later merged in the late 1970s with Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party into the single legal state party, the Chama 
cha Mapinduzi, or Party of Revolution. 
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directed populist dilemma’, reliance on ‘the people’ as a value and the ‘establish-
ment’ as the enemy, while embracing a largely conservative economic platform that 
accepts wholesale the neo-liberal demands of the international and national corpora-
tions and lending agencies.  This stance often requires public rejection of ‘structural 
adjustment policies’ advocated by international lending agencies, for example, while 
quietly supporting them. 
 
NIGERIA’S GRADUAL MOVE TO LIMITED ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY: POPULIST UNITY 
FROM ETHNIC DIVISION? 
 
Contrary to expectations by both local and international observers of Nigeria, the 
28 March 2015 presidential election was relatively peaceful and was significantly de-
void of the political violence that was anticipated prior to the election. For the first 
time in Nigeria’s political history, the country witnessed an incumbent president los-
ing in an election, accepting defeat, and peacefully handing over power to the oppo-
sition candidate. Based on the outcome of this election, some political analyst have 
argued that perhaps Nigeria had come of age in the democratisation process, and 
could be categorised as having at least a limited form of democracy which, as Andre-
as Schedler (2006) argues, is a system where elections are free and fair, and opposi-
tion parties and candidates can freely campaign without any form of political intimi-
dation by the ruling party. Crucially, the difference between electoral democracy and 
any other quasi-democratic form, such as an electoral authoritarian system, lies in 
the degree of freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of elections that 
are allowed to take place. A closer examination into the last general election reveals 
that this might be the case in Nigeria, given that there was apparently a move toward 
a form of electoral democracy after several flawed attempts (1999, 2003, 2007 and, 
to a degree, 2011). Despite this, the election also probably highlighted more danger-
ous trends than in previous elections, that is, the ethnic patterns that seem to have 
characterised voting. 
 Since the formal transition of Nigeria from a military authoritarian system to that 
of civilian rule in 1999, it has been apparently difficult for scholars to characterise the 
civilianisation process the country has undergone. Part of the reason for this is per-
haps the manner in which Nigeria transitioned into a formal democratic system, what 
Kayode Fayemi described as a ‘vague’ transition process, a process whereby the pre-
dominately Hausa-Fulani military elite, who at that time were keen on protecting its 
vested interests in the polity, ensured that a retired military general and former mili-
tary head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, became president at the end of formal mili-
tary rule (Fayemi, 1999). To further complicate matters, the leadership style of 
Obasanjo had significant military elements that were comparable to that of military 
rule. It constituted a civilian system in which, as Cyril Obi notes, was “a political tran-
sition without a democratic transformation” (Obi, 2011, p. 367). That it was also de-
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cidedly populist underscores the extent to which at least some of the earlier military 
dictatorships were genuinely populist, and decidedly African populist, regimes well 
before the advent of electoral democracy in Nigeria. 
A number of labels have been applied to define Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, includ-
ing pseudo-democratic, garrison, hybrid, militarised, electoral authoritarianism, 
electoralism, illiberal, and ambiguous, among others (Agbaje; Adejumobi, 2006). It 
should be noted, however, that even though some scholars are unclear as to why a 
given label is applied to Nigeria, others go into great detail in justifying their classifi-
cation (Diamond, 2002). Overall, the studies on democratization in Nigeria over the 
last decade or so have presented this period as less than democratic although the 
country typically holds elections that are, at least on paper, multiparty and competi-
tive. 
Minus the challenges of providing adequate security in the country which have 
significantly increased in post-military Nigeria including the rise since 1999 of violent 
ethnic and religiously-inspired militias, it is important to note that the persistence of 
electoral irregularities that have marked numerous post-1999 elections in Nigeria 
suggests that there are challenges to the deepening of democratic principles in the 
country, especially in major political contests at the federal level.  It is therefore, per-
haps unsurprising that a significantly number of electoral outcomes have resulted in 
violence. For example, it has been estimated that in first six years of the civilisation 
process in Nigeria (1999 to 2006), more than 11,000 Nigerians lost their lives in elec-
toral violence (Ewi, 2015, p. 217). Considering that Nigeria’s political arrangement is 
ostensibly that of a competitive multi-party system, it might have been expected that 
this pluralistic arrangement, one that guarantees a diversity of choices in elections, 
would minimise at least to some extent cases of electoral violence. However, an ex-
amination of the political parties in Nigeria, (approximately 63 in number) shows that 
a majority of them are financially insolvent and ideologically nondescript. A signifi-
cant number of these parties are inactive, effectively cease to exist in any meaningful 
sense immediately after elections, and mainly exist to collect grants from the Inde-
pendent National Electoral Commission (INEC). They also serve as a form of ‘fall back 
mechanism’ for elite members of the ruling party when and if they have disagree-
ments with their own ruling party (Obi, 2011). 
The most important phenomenon that best characterises the perversion of the 
electoral system and party process in Nigeria is what is termed the ‘political godfa-
ther’ phenomenon within the political party processes. This phenomenon, which is 
significantly pronounced within the ruling political parties, consist of political “indi-
viduals [who] possess considerable means to unilaterally determine who gets a par-
ty’s ticket to run for an election and who wins in the electoral contest” (Obi, 2011, p. 
367). A successful political godfather is therefore, a person or group of persons who 
have financial resources, and the ability to manipulate the grassroots and/or political 
constituencies, to determine electoral victories. In a scenario where the ‘anointed 
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godson/person’ is facing near electoral defeat, the political godfather is able to use 
violence and/or corruption to manipulate the system to their advantage. 
The godfather phenomenon in Nigeria’s political party machinery has become a 
significant contributor to numerous anti-democratic practices that have occurred in 
the democratisation process since 1999 (Albert, 2005). These ‘political godfathers’ 
promote a closed system of political recruitment and selection process.  Aspiring 
candidates or elected ‘godsons’ must consult with the godfather on all major political 
issues, and failure to do so can lead to violence.  An example of this occurred in 
Anambra state between 2003 to 2006 period. The then-governor of the state, Chris 
Ngige, fell out of favour with his political godfather, Chris Uba, and the crises that 
ensued were never resolved.  Eventually Ngige was expelled from office in 2006 when 
an election tribunal nullified his 2003 election ex post facto, a ruling that was upheld 
by a Federal Court of Appeals (Newsday, 2015).  
It is within this political context that anti-democratic elements have undermined 
popular participation. When Nigeria went to the polls on 28 March 2015, local and 
international observers were concerned that the election might be among the blood-
iest in Nigeria’s political history.  Some commentators even suggested that the elec-
tion might threaten the very existence of the Nigerian state.16 There was a high level 
of insecurity in the country at the time, especially in the northeast, where Boko Ha-
ram had occupied a large territory, claiming it as part of the larger Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In addition, the Jonathan government also had to confront 
a sluggish economy because of the falling prices of crude oil, a high unemployment 
rate, and a severe fuel scarcity, all just prior to the election. The feared violence did 
not take place, however, and the first peaceful and constitutional handover of power 
from one party to another in Nigerian political history took place. 
The election of 28 March therefore was a success, exemplifying the Nigerian elec-
toral democracy under extreme stress, with a weary electorate dominated by a popu-
list party for 16 years, tired of broken promises by that party, and yet still very vul-
nerable to populist rhetoric.  Anti-corruption, the populist icon, was front and centre, 
with media reports that alleged that some of Jonathan’s key ministers were greatly 
misappropriating public funds for private gains. Additionally, personal security, and 
the rise of a Muslim guerrilla organisation, Boko Haram, against which the military 
seemed powerless, added a component of fear to the populist rhetoric of the main 
opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), and its campaign slogan, 
‘change’. The APC had been formed in 2013 with the merging of the three main op-
position parties—the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive 
Change (CPC), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressives 
Grand Alliance (APGA).  
Perhaps the key to the peaceful transition was, in fact, the question of security.  To 
                                                          
16
 For more on the last presidential elections see Ewi Martin. Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a 
victory for boko haram or for democracy? African Security Review 24, p. 207-231, 2015. 
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solidify their opposition credentials, the APC nominated another former military rul-
er, Major General Mohammadu Buhari, who had previously sought the elected posi-
tion of president on three different occasions, but had failed in the past as the alter-
native to Jonathan’s PDP. Buhari was seen as an incorruptible individual whose previ-
ous military credentials suggested that he could tackle the many socio-economic 
challenges confronting Nigeria as an ‘outsider’, just as he had attempted to do as mil-
itary head of state between 1983 and 1985, while addressing the fundamental ques-
tion of personal security. 
The last general election in Nigeria, therefore, seems at first glance at least, to 
have been a victory for electoral democracy. The ability of Nigeria to conduct a rela-
tively credible election that unseated an incumbent president and at the same time 
did not descend into extreme post-electoral violence, represented a formidable victo-
ry for electoral democracy. It also appears, however, to have represented a victory 
for neo-liberal populism, given the platform of the Buhari candidacy and his early pol-
icies.  While it remains too early to know whether subsequent elections, especially at 
the lower levels (state and local governments), will become more credible, less vul-
nerable to populist rhetoric and policies, and less devoid of post-electoral violence, 
these outcomes seem unlikely. 
We can focus on the praise from both local and international observers over the 
conduct of the election and the manner in which Goodluck Jonathan called 
Mohammadu Buhari on phone even before the final electoral results were declared 
by INEC to concede defeat.  Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to ignore the deep 
ethno-religious divide that continue to characterise the system. Significant numbers 
of Igbos and ethnic groups from the Niger Delta (were Jonathan comes from) voted 
for the incumbent president, while the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani tended to vote for 
Buhari (Owen; Usman, 2015). The bitter ethnic divide between the Igbos and the Yo-
ruba, which persisted after the end of the Biafra war, still affects these two major 
ethnic groups.  Although the last general election has been praised globally, and 
seems to highlight a degree of maturity in the democratising process in Nigeria, it 
appears it has continued the populist patterns of post-1999 Nigeria, and has left un-
resolved key elements of ethnic voting that calls into question the basis of national 
unity that is so vital to continuing democratization in Nigeria.   
 
THE EMERGENCE OF NEO-LIBERAL MILITARY-DIRECTED POPULISM IN NIGERIA 
 
The relative success of the 2015 presidential election raises a key question relating 
to whether the victory of a former military dictator is a victory for democracy in Nige-
ria, or rather what this article hypothesises is the emergence of neo-liberal military-
directed populism. As earlier noted, populism, even though not extensively discussed 
in Nigerian literature, is not new to the country.  It has its roots in neo-liberal military-
directed populism that traces back to a period in the political history of the country 
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when the military justified its intervention in politics as the necessary result of the 
failure of civilian political elites and rampant elite political corruption. The military 
intervened at that juncture as a ‘corrective regime’, ostensibly to eradicate political 
corruption and encourage the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, although at 
the inception of the regime, they appear to be protectionists in terms of economic 
policies.  
It must be emphasised, however, that neo-liberal military-directed populism in Ni-
geria should be distinguished from other populist strategies that may have been em-
ployed by numerous political elites (both federal and local) since democratization in 
1999. It is also different in a general context from political and/or social movements 
that appeal for popular support on different kinds of policies such as, empowering 
women, gay rights, allowing Syrian refugees into Europe etc. Neo-liberal military-
directed populism in Nigeria can be labelled as a synonym of demagogy or political 
opportunism that have been used effectively by two former military dictators 
(Olusegun Obasanjo and Mohammadu Buhari), who have subsequently become pres-
idents post-1999 to legitimise their political parties’ electoral victories and to consoli-
date their political gains. In and out of political office, these two ex-military generals 
have presented themselves as the ‘outsider’ and attack the corrupt ‘establishment’/ 
‘professional politicians’ or ‘ruling elites’ for not taking a hard stance on core issues 
that will ameliorate the sufferings of the large poor population in Nigeria. The pattern 
in which neo-liberal military-directed populism has apparently manifested itself in 
post-military Nigeria has taken three forms: first, in an emphasis on fighting elite cor-
ruption; second, in an emphasis on national security in an era of insecurity; and, last-
ly, at first glance appears to be economic protectionist policies, and yet adopt several 
international neo-liberal prescriptions of Bretton-Woods institutions such as the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 
First, corruption in all its ramifications has been described as a malicious cancer in 
Nigeria and the country has, indeed, ranked among the most corrupt nations in world 
according to respected international reports, such as Transparency International’s (TI) 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Under the period of military rule in Nigeria, this 
corruption rhetoric was used by virtually all military coup plotters to justify their 
takeover of government. Also, their takeover speeches or initial press meetings all 
had a similar pattern of emphasising this corruption rhetoric and ranged from Gen-
eral Murtala Mohammed 1975 takeover speech were he stated,  
 
Fellow Nigerians, events of the past few years have indicated that despite 
our great human and material resources, the government has not been able 
to fulfil the legitimate expectation of our people; Nigeria has been left to 
drift…(Daily Times, 1975, p. 3) 
 
To that of Major General Muhammadu Buhari, who in his first press conference in 
1984 after the 31 December 1983 military takeover outlined the regime ten point 
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agenda that included, “clean[ing] the society of the cankerworm of pervasive corrup-
tion” (Daily Times, 1984, p. 1).  And General Sani Abacha who affirmed at the inaugu-
ration of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) on 24 November 1993 that his govern-
ment will “mobilise all resources at its disposal to fight the menace of corruption, 
armed banditry and drug trafficking” (Abdulsalami, 1993, p. 26). Under the current 
civilianisation process, this corruption rhetoric has continued. It is, therefore, unsur-
prising that upon assumption of office on 29 May 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo stated 
that there would be ‘no sacred cows’ during his administration. In his inaugural 
speech, Obasanjo noted that no society can achieve anything close to its full potential 
if it allows corruption to become the ‘full-blown cancer’ that it had become in Nige-
ria. He went on to note that corruption was “the greatest single bane of [Nigeria’s] 
society today [and would] be tackled head-on at all levels” (Nigeria World, 1999). 
As an indication of its determination to fight corruption, the government instituted 
the Christopher Kolade Panel to review all previous appointments, contracts, licenses, 
approvals and awards made by governments’ after 1966, when the military had first 
directly intervened in politics. To legalise the anti-corruption campaign, an anti-
corruption bill was submitted to the National Assembly; this later became law, on 13 
June 2000. It prohibits most forms of corruption and prescribes punishments for cor-
rupt practices and other related offences. It also defines corruption that is punishable 
by law. The government established two anti-corruption agencies, the Independent 
Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The ICPC is empowered by law to investi-
gate, try and assign punishments, while the EFCC is mandated to investigate and 
prosecute financial crimes such as advance fee fraud (419 fraud) and cases of money 
laundering. 
Throughout the Obasanjo administration, there were numerous media reports 
that the government’s anti-corruption fight was yielding results. During the first 
phase of that presidency, politicians and top-level bureaucrats were reported to have 
refunded to the government money that was reported to have been taken through 
corrupt practices. Western governments and big transnational banks also aided the 
government in recovering some of the resources reportedly taken by former military 
ruler General Sani Abacha.17 Under the current government of Muhammadu Buhari, 
there are significant similarities between the Obasanjo populist anti-establishment 
positions in office, especially in the area of fighting corruption, and those of the 
Buhari government. Since Buhari’s assumption of office, numerous financial investi-
gations into alleged corruption of the government of Goodluck Jonathan have been 
initiated (Daniel; Nnochiri, 2015). Prominent individuals in the past government, such 
as the former national security adviser retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki, then minister of 
                                                          
17
 For more on the initial efforts made by the Olusegun Obasanjo government to trace the money stolen by 
General Sani Abacha see Guardian Newspaper. Tracking the billions. The guardian newspaper (Nigeria). p. 8-9, 
2000. 
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petroleum and finance, Allison Madueke and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and high ranking 
retired and serving military officers, have been accused by the current government of 
misappropriating public funds in their given political portfolios (Premium Times, 
2015). 
Second, just as in military rule in Nigeria were another key rhetoric used by the 
military elites to justify their intervention in politics related to maintaining law and 
order, and guaranteeing the security of life and property, the maintenance of nation-
al security has been an important component of the rhetoric used under the post-
1999 civilian governments, especially given the protracted state of insecurity in the 
country. The most notable threat at present is that of Boko Haram that mainly oper-
ates in the north-eastern part of the country.  
During the last presidential campaign, the APC effectively used this rhetoric of na-
tional security in their party campaigns across the country to justify Muhammadu 
Buhari’s credentials for president over than of Goodluck Jonathan, and they also em-
phasised the need to elect an individual with military background given the dire state 
of insecurity in the country. In one of such campaigns held in Lagos, Ahmed Bola 
Tinubu, a key leader of the APC, although not historically accurate in the statements 
made during this campaign rally, stated that:  
 
I prayed that Nigeria would get better and we would not need a man like 
him [Buhari]. But today, we are in great crises; we face a lot of challenges. 
When South Africa was in a great dilemma and was about to disintegrate, 
they called Nelson Mandela of 74 years old. He used his wisdom to save his 
country. When the United States was in economic depression they called 73 
years old Ronald Reagan because he was frugal and incorruptible…when 
America was faced with depression and war, they called a retired General, 
Dwight Eisenhower, to rescue the country and the country was returned on 
a path of success. When France was faced with war and economic depres-
sion, they called a retired General, Charles De Gaulle; to rescue the coun-
try… so what do we need now? Buhari… we are calling you to come and 
rescue us in Nigeria (Sotubo, 2015).    
 
In addition to the rhetoric of national security and the protection of life and prop-
erty, the maintenance of national security in the country appears to be interwoven 
with a deliberate strategy of all four post-1999 presidents in Nigeria to strengthen 
and re-emphasise the secular nature of the Nigerian state, especially as it relates to 
guaranteeing individual rights of freedom of religion. This has, however, represented 
a separate set of challenges. For example, at the end of 2001, twelve majority Muslim 
states in Nigeria instituted the application of sharia (Islamic law) even though this 
caused numerous controversies regarding the legality of such action. Some political 
analysts went so far as to argue that the implementation of sharia by these states 
violated the 1999 Constitution. The response of President Obasanjo, a Christian from 
the South, to address these concerns, was notably indecisive, moreover.  He said that 
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the situation represented a kind of ‘political sharia’, rather than a ‘real sharia’, and 
that it would ‘soon fizzle out’ (Nmehielle, 2004, p. 754). The perceived passivity of 
Obasanjo and subsequent governments to sensitive religious issues, especially in a 
‘religiously charged’ country like Nigeria, appears to have added to a climate of inse-
curity in the country.  
That is why it seems problematic for previous and the current government to ad-
dress the threats posed by Boko Haram. For example, even though it is known that in 
recent times Boko Haram has been using young girls wearing hijabs/burqa as suicide 
bombers, the government seems unable to take a more drastic approach that might 
include the outright banning of hijabs/burqa worn by women in public places in 
communities greatly affected by Boko Haram. Such actions would only lead to more 
radicalisation and thus be counter-productive (Economist, 2016). 
Lastly, all four of the post-1999 Nigerian leaders have overtly embraced and en-
couraged numerous neo-liberal economic policies, as prescribed by Bretton-Woods 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). His-
torically, the World Bank and the IMF were initially created immediately after the 
Second World War, in 1945, to stabilise the global economic system and prevent the 
return to the 1930s economic nationalism that the great powers at that time had im-
plemented in response to the great depression. The roles these financial institutions 
play in the global economic system include encouraging free trade, advising the mon-
etary policies of states, and providing loans with conditionalities to those countries 
that are experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. Such conditionalities usually 
include exchange-rate adjustments (devaluation of currency) and the total removal of 
subsidies and tariffs that restrict imports of goods at full international prices, etc. 
(Gilpin, 1987).   
However, Nigeria’s first formal request for financial assistance (loan) with its 
conditionalities from the IMF did not occur until the mid-1980s. The Bretton-Woods 
inspired Structural Adjustment Programme ‘SAP’ was introduced to Nigeria in 1986 
under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) as a lasting solution to 
the country’s frequent and continuous economic cycles of prosperity and depression, 
thought to be based upon its over-reliance on a single natural resource (crude oil) as 
it major source of foreign exchange. The measures recommended as part of the loan 
conditions meant that Nigeria had to undergo a major devaluation of its currency, 
privatise public enterprises, deregulate the domestic market, liberalise foreign trade 
and credit, and put restraints on its money supply. Unsurprisingly, the implementa-
tions of the IMF loan conditions have had a profound negative effect on the Nigerian 
economy. Under Babangida, the per capita income of US$778 in 1985, declined to 
US$175 in 1988 and further dropped to US$108 in 1989 (Osaghae, 1998: 204). Since 
that period, there has been a drastic and continuous visible decline in the mainte-
nance and construction of the basic social infrastructure. The quality of public educa-
tion has fallen significantly, there is a continuous massive brain drain, and access to 
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basic government services such as health care has become prohibitively expensive for 
many and unreliable for the rest. This has directly fed into the neo-liberal military-
directed populist rhetoric because a significant number of Nigeria’s large poor popu-
lation are vulnerable to rhetoric that promises to provide or implement policies that 
would address their needs, for example, provision of free and qualitative health care, 
free education up to the tertiary level and full employment etc.  
All four post-1999 leaders in Nigeria have greatly encouraged numerous neo-
liberal populist economic policies. Under Umaru Musa Yar’Adua government (2007-
2010), its economic policy to ameliorate the sufferings of the large poor population of 
the country was called the ‘seven-point agenda’. These seven areas the government 
reasoned were at the core of revamping Nigeria’s socio-economic development. The 
seven areas were power and energy; infrastructure; food security; wealth creation; 
transport sector; land reforms; security; and, education. Similarly, under Goodluck 
Jonathan (2010-2015), the government created another economic program called the 
‘transformation agenda’. Just as the previous economic policy of Umaru Yar’ Adua, 
this program was meant to address the inability of Nigeria to actually achieve its full 
economic potentials and also ameliorate the sufferings of the populace. The trans-
formation agenda program, however, had a much wider scope than the previous 
economic policy of Yar’Adua as it was designed to revamp the entire economic and 
bureaucratic sectors of Nigeria at the same time. As a result, the program was meant 
to transform the transport sector, energy and petroleum, finance and banking, agri-
culture, create jobs, and strengthen the capital market etc.  
In terms of neo-liberal military-directed populism that has been used by Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1999-2007) and Mohammadu Buhari (2015- ), the economic policy used by 
these two former military generals before assumption into office and/or during the 
earlier stages of their presidencies appear to have a semblance with economic pro-
tectionism especially in the area of protecting local industries, currency control/fixed 
exchange rate mechanism and retaining petroleum subsidy. Under Obasanjo’s gov-
ernment, there were policies that banned certain products from being imported into 
the country. For example, the banning of foreign firms importing cement unless those 
firms had plans to set-up plants in Nigeria. There were also bans on poultry products, 
furniture, bottled water and fruit juice etc. The rationale for this policy was for the 
protecting of certain local industries and at the same time boost Nigeria’s manufac-
turing capability significantly. However, Obasanjo’s economic protectionist policies 
were contradicted by other economic policies implemented by the same govern-
ment. For example, the government actively encouraged several neo-liberal econom-
ic policies such as, allowing significant private sector participation in the economic 
sector and implemented numerous structural reforms that ranged from privatisation 
of some state-owned public enterprises, the liquidation of others (Nigeria Airways), 
the deregulation of the petroleum sector, reforming the civil service, banking sector, 
and the liberalization of certain trade policies etc. (The Economist, 2014). In addition, 
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the government created the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS). In sum, the NEEDS program significantly emphasised the role pri-
vate sector partnership can play in the economic development of Nigeria. This the 
government felt was achievable based on the belief that the private sector is an im-
portant driver to wealth creation and poverty reduction in any society (Okonjo-
Iweala; Osafo-Kwaako, 2007). 
A similar trend has continued under Buhari’s government. However, unlike his 
predecessors, the current president is yet to come up with a ‘fancy’ name for his eco-
nomic program although during his electoral campaign he mentioned several eco-
nomic areas that his government would immediately address if elected. These areas, 
however, do not differ significantly from the other economic programs of the previ-
ous governments’ post-1999. What stood out in the APC campaign program was the 
promise of paying unemployed Nigerian youths a monthly stipend of ₦5,000. How-
ever, in the first half of 2016, Buhari backtracked on this party promise and stated 
that his government had a different priority at this moment which included empow-
ering unemployed youths to get back into the workforce (Nwabughiogu, 2015). Also, 
just as in Obasanjo’s presidency, Buhari’s economic policies have moved from aspects 
that have economic protectionist policies to the adoption of more neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies. For example, the government initially introduced a fixed exchange 
policy/currency control as a means of saving up Nigeria’s foreign reserves due to the 
current low price of crude oil in the international market that have significant re-
duced Nigeria major source of foreign exchange earnings. Also, as part of Buhari’s 
electoral campaign pledge, the government affirmed that the functional capability of 
the state-run Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) will be strengthen sig-
nificantly. This basically meant functional oil refineries working at their optimum op-
erational capacity and the non-removal of petroleum subsidy. However, in the se-
cond half of 2016, the government backtracked on these campaign promises and ba-
sically re-introduced policies that the APC/Buhari had previously heavily criticized the 
Goodluck Jonathan government of, I mean, petroleum subsidy removal and restoring 
the ability of market forces to determine the exchange rate (Onu; Wallace, 2016).   
 
CONCLUSION: THE NEO-LIBERAL MILITARY-DIRECTED POPULIST PARADOX IN 
NIGERIA 
 
This article hypothesized that there has been a great deal of continuity between 
some of the presidential periods in the pre-1999 and post-1999 eras, and that Nigeria 
appears to have pioneered a distinctive African variant of neo-liberal military-
directed populism in the pre-1999 period that survived largely, but not completely, 
intact after 1999. This also seems to explain why numerous scholarly writings on Ni-
geria post-1999 has been widely criticised as largely undemocratic. This conclusion 
among scholars on Nigeria is not surprising considering the various undemocratic ac-
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tivities that recur in the polity and has been explained in this article. However, even 
though it can be argued that Nigeria has made significant progress in its democratisa-
tion process since its transition from military dictatorship, this article argues that 
there is a preference for populism over democracy in Nigeria. It should be noted, that 
populism can exist in democratising systems such as Nigeria, especially when at pre-
sent there is a general resentment among the populace that their elected representa-
tives are not adequately catering for their needs. As Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens 
notes,  
 
Populist resentments arise when constitutional democracy is perceived to 
be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar… [and] that elected 
representatives are out of touch with the popular will generate the feeling 
that popular sovereignty is undermined (Abts and Rummens, 2007, p. 405-
424). 
 
It is within these general resentments that has allowed Olusegun Obasanjo and 
Muhammadu Buhari to capitalise on and continue this neo-liberal military-directed 
populism, which may have even further prolonged military rule in Nigeria if not for 
General Sani Abacha who decided to favour a more statist and nationalist economic 
agenda in power. Abacha decided not to negotiate with the Bretton-Woods institu-
tions and under his rule Nigeria accumulated millions of dollars of debt arrears. 
Throughout his regime, the country did not solicit any loans from these international 
financial institutions (Lewis, 1996).   
Finally, this article suggests that there seems to be a preference for populism over 
democracy in Nigeria, although it is somewhat of a paradox. As political events have 
shown in Nigeria, the anti-establishment neo-liberal military-directed populist rheto-
ric used mainly by the two presidents who were the foci of this study, appear to have 
done the opposite of their rhetoric in government. Which is, the failure to significant-
ly implement their populist economic policies in office (elements of economic protec-
tionism), significantly guarantee national security and fight elite corruption. This par-
adox conclusion on neo-liberal military-directed populism in Nigeria is similar to a 
recent research conducted by Danielle Resnick (2014), who noted similar trends in 
some other democratising African countries. However, it should be noted that 
Resnick central thesis focused entirely on why the urban poor in African democracies 
tend to vote for oppositions parties and used cases that did not have decades of mili-
tary rule in the analyses (mostly Zambia and Senegal). This article, however, analysed 
populism with a case (Nigeria) that historically, had decades of military rule which 
was essentially, the norm in a majority of African countries for decades. Therefore, 
more research on populism in an African context needs to go beyond the diverse 
forms of populism in Africa as analysed by Banywesize (2013) or the populist strate-
gies adopted by some African leaders in office (Makulilo, 2013). More research on 
populism needs to be conducted on African societies that have had decades of mili-
Democracy vs. Populism: the transformation of politics in Nigeria? 187 
PRACS: Revista Eletrônica de Humanidades do Curso de Ciências Sociais da UNIFAP 
https://periodicos.unifap.br/index.php/pracs   ISSN 1984-4352   Macapá, v. 10, n. 1, p. 169-189, jan./jun. 2017 
tary rule and are now in various phases of democratisation. Whether there is a great 
deal of continuity between some of their past populist military rulers and their cur-
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